

OFFICE OF THE DD/I

Date: 5 Mar 75

STAT

TO:

OGC

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FROM:

SUBJECT: Classification Standards

I am attaching my first rough cut at a synthesis of comments provided by our offices and staffs.

In my summary, I refer briefly to matters covered in the various attachments, especially Tabs A through F. I suggest you refer to the documents themselves for a fuller treatment.

You may also want to refer to Tab J for thoughts on one approach to developing an analytical framework for evaluating the sensitivity of sources and methods.

I'm not sure where we go from here. I would be happy to discuss our input further, or you may want to meld our comments into your listing.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Proctor/Walsh

Re: Protection of Sources and Methods.

I doubt that you'll want to wade through all of this now. I've sent a copy to OGC and will delete it from our projects list.

The next step, I believe, will be the development of a consolidated Agency list of the types of sources and methods needing protection. I'll make sure you see the draft as soon as it's available.

Then someone has to decide what combination of regulations, directives, etc. will afford the best protection. A new DCID along the lines of 6/3 may be the eventual result.

6 Mar 75

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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DDI-508-75

19 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DDI Executive Staff

SUBJECT : Classification Standards

Attached are FBIS recommendations regarding subjects which require protection from FOIA release, but not necessarily classification. This list is submitted in response to your memorandum on the same subject of 12 February.



Director  
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Attachment: As stated

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2. UNCLASSIFIED BY

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19 February 1975

SUBJECTS REQUIRING PROTECTION FROM FOIA RELEASE  
TO PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS

25X1 1. Association of named FBIS installations and employees overseas with CIA. Public acknowledgment of overt CIA activities abroad may jeopardize continued FBIS operations for political reasons in a given country, [redacted] and may place FBIS employees and facilities in physical hazard, e.g. by terrorist attack.

25X1 25X1 2. Association of foreign monitoring services such as those [redacted]

[redacted] Public acknowledgment of these relationships could cause such services to withdraw or withhold cooperative relationships with CIA. An example of an unclassified document detailing such linkage is the monthly [redacted] coverage schedule which is issued "For Official Use Only."

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25X1 3. Association of JPRS contract translators with CIA. The association of over a thousand JPRS independent contractors with CIA is not classified, but neither is it general public knowledge. Public association with CIA may subject these contractors--citizens and non-citizens in all walks of life--to harassment, invasion of privacy or embarrassment thereby potentially damaging this valuable intelligence method.

[redacted]

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20 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DDI Executive Staff

SUBJECT : Classification Standards

1. The problem of classification standards has been reviewed in this office. Our objective was to provide you and the Office of the General Counsel with a list of subjects dealing with "sources and methods" which needs the protection of a classification system. Following are the results of our effort.

2. Discussion with the members of this office and review of existing information, laws and regulations made it clear that attention devoted, thus far, to the protection of sources and methods has been unevenly applied in favor of sources and operational methods. Less attention has been devoted to that which is the main matter of our business and in all probability the keystone of the intelligence process-- analytical methods. There is little doubt that collection means, i.e. the means of acquiring information by technical or clandestine means require protection from exposure, interdiction, deception or exposure of their accuracy, and utility. Little attention however seems devoted to the protection of the utility of the results of collection means and sources and most importantly to the effectiveness and in some cases the fact of analytical methodologies which collate, process, evaluate and assess the information from all sources, overt and covert to produce the product of our business-- intelligence. The difficult aspect of the problem however seems to be that of determining how to specify the myriad methods we employ to convert collected information into intelligence. There is no single method of analysis. Some are basic, repetitive and continuous. Others are unique to a one-time or unique problem. Following are two types of methodological approaches which we feel require the protection of classification.

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19 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DDI Executive Staff

SUBJECT : OCI Comments on Classification Standards

1. Several specific sources of information, or categories of information, appear to OCI to warrant consideration as possible subjects for protection by statute. There follows a brief definition and explanatory comment on each.
2. Compendia of finished current intelligence articles and the methods by which they are prepared. Here we are thinking, of course, about the Daily, the PDB, and to a lesser degree, other periodicals resulting from the compilation and selection of many individual items of intelligence interest-- frequently including some of considerable sensitivity. Could it not be made legally impossible for a private citizen to get access to one or more Daily editions, distribution lists, and details on how and why individual articles in such publications are selected? Free public access to such documents could damage the national security by exposing the quality and range of our intelligence assessments on the rest of the world and the priorities we have established among the various intelligence targets.
3. Sensitive analytical judgments or conclusions. Should we not protect the unique by-product of a CIA analyst's mind when he comes up with an important judgment, even if the raw material from which it is derived is not protected by the statute? The problem here, of course, is to define clearly which analytical judgments require protection and which do not. As matters now stand, however, all such analysis presumably is not protected.
4. Materials confidentially acquired from and controlled by another agency. Examples are certain economic data provided

Executive Officer, OCI

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20 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DDI Executive Staff

SUBJECT : Some Additional Thoughts on  
Classification Standards

1. As a result of the recent request of OGC for classification standards, I have had a number of discussions on the subject with various members of CGAS. It would seem that instead of relying too heavily on discrete listings "of the various aspects of intelligence sources and the various aspects of intelligence methods that require protection from unauthorized disclosure," it would be better to establish some kind of an analytical framework that would more precisely establish why a source or methodology should be or remain classified.

25X1 2. [ ] of the SIGINT Group of this Staff has  
come up with one such approach that I believe merits further  
consideration. While admittedly in an embryonic stage of development,  
25X1 [ ] proposal might spark a better approach  
to the overall problem, one that could provide more consistent  
rationality, have increased explicitness and hold up better in  
court.

25X1 3. [ ] would start off by taking a look at what  
is really involved in the term "sources and methods."

- Collectors: Collection of information obviously  
relates to a variety of information sources  
(communications, broadcasts, facilities,  
individuals, etc.) and the methods by which  
the information is acquired [ ]

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